The failure of the structural monetary model to beat a random walk in out-of-sample forecasting is one of the most celebrated empirical (non) findings in international finance. In this paper we show that this result is an artifact of the way monetary policy is measured. We construct a simple measure of monetary policy based on the narrative approach of Romer & Romer (1989) . Using a linear Gaussian autoregressive specification with exogenous variables (ARX), we demonstrate that a structural monetary model with properly measured money does indeed outperform the random walk in out-of-sample forecasts over a wide range of horizons. We conclude that contrary to the conventional wisdom, money (appropriately defined) is a robust fundamental determinant of short-run exchange rate dynamics. JEL classification codes: F31, G12
I. Introduction
One of the great disappointments of exchange rates economics is the failure of two decades of intensive research to identify the fundamental determinants * Thanks to Ethan Harris and Columbia Pictures for inspiring the title. We are greatly indebted to Jorge Streb and an anonymous referee who helped strengthen the paper. We thank Amy Basile and Tracey Frommelt for their excellent research assistance and Patrick Asea , Gregory Hess, Joseph Joyce and the participants of the Tufts and Federal Reserve Bank of New York seminars. of observed exchange rate dynamics. Starting with the influential work of Meese & Rogoff (1983) a large body of research has documented that the random walk model out-performs a wide class of structural and time series (univariate and multivariate) models in short run out-of-sample prediction. The superiority of the random walk model over structural exchange rate models has withstood Bayesian and classical methods, the Kalman filter, maximum entropy methods, nonparametric and nonlinear methods. This celebrated empirical finding has been shown to be remarkably robust to different methods of pre-filtering (differencing, deseasonalizing and removing trends), lag length choice and prediction criteria.
The conventional wisdom is that further attempts to explain short-term exchange rate movements based solely on macroeconomic fundamentals will not prove successful. Baxter & Stockman (1989) , Flood & Rose (1995) conclude that the usual set of macroeconomic fundamentals is unlikely to explain exchange rate movements. However, Taylor (1995) suggests models that rely on rich dynamic specifications can beat a random walk over the long horizon, see and Chin and Meese (1995) . Yet this is exactly what we set out to accomplish in the present paper. Given the conventional wisdom some will say that we are embarked on a fool's errand and the title of the paper "Dumb and Dumber" refers to a quixotic quest. Instead, it refers to the use of dummy variables to measure changes in monetary policy. The dummy variables are constructed from a narrative analysis of the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings held between 1974:1 and 1995:3 (the entire post-Bretton Woods era) in the tradition of Friedman & Schwartz (1963) and Romer & Romer (1989) .
When we include the narrative measure of monetary policy as an explanatory variable in an extremely simple Gaussian linear ARX specification, we find that the model out-of-performs a random walk in out of sample prediction for several currencies over the post -Bretton Woods era. The empirical results suggest the dismal performance of the structural monetary model in previous work is largely due to the use of imprecise shortterm measures of monetary policy such as the federal funds rate, three month T-Bills, M1, M2 or non-borrowed reserves. The narrative approach has substantial explanatory power over traditional measures of monetary policy because it relies on the actual decisions of policy-makers to identify policy changes. This is important because the Federal Reserve has used different policy instruments in the post -Bretton Woods era which has made it extremely difficult for any single traditional measure of monetary policy to have explanatory power for exchange rates. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) use of the Romer & Romer (1989) dates (along with other measures of monetary policy) to examine the effects of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates is closest in spirit to the present analysis.
1 With traditional measures of money such as federal fund rate shocks on reserve based measures, Eichenbaum & Evans find that the dynamic response of contractionary money is positive and has a significant influence on nominal exchange rates for up to three years. When the authors account for possible omitted variables bias, only the federal funds rate shock continues to be statistically significant. However, Romer & Romer measures of monetary policy are statistically insignificant.
Our analysis differs from Eichenbaum & Evans (1995) in several ways. First, the method we use to construct the narrative measure of monetary policy reduces some of subjectivity biases associated with Romer & Romer dates. Second, we provide a more complete categorization of Federal Reserve actions by identifying both contractions and expansions in monetary policy. Third, we use daily exchange rate data which has several advantages over monthly averages. As Meese & Rogoff (1983) note "point sample data have a decided advantage over monthly average data."
For instance, suppose the exchange rate follows a random walk on a midday to mid-day basis. Then as Working (1960) observed, "a time series of monthly averages of mid-day rates will exhibit serial correlation." Obviously, the presence of serial correlation yields inefficient estimates and in the presence of lagged dependent variables will lead to biased estimates. Finally, Eichenbaum & Evans (1995) do not provide out-of-sample forecasts which is the primary task of the paper.
In a related paper, Blomberg and Hess (1997) have found certain political factors to be important in explaining exchange rate behavior over short horizons. However, the authors recognize that this is at best a tentative explanation for the exchange rate dynamics as they refer to it as "the exchange rate politics puzzle." It is likely that these political factors are proxies for a subset of the underlying fundamentals driving exchange rates.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In section II we describe our methodology we use to identify changes in monetary policy. Section III briefly reviews the basic structural model. The results are shown in section IV. Finally, section V sums up the paper and offers suggestions for future research.
II. Identifying Shifts in Monetary Policy
In this section, we describe the method we use to identify shifts in monetary policy. We use the narrative approach, pioneered by Friedman & Schwartz (1963) , and more recently used in Romer & Romer (1989) . With the narrative approach one uses historical records of the minutes of FOMC meetings to identify dates when the Federal Reserve shifted policy.
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The advantage of the narrative approach is the potential ability to disentangle money supply from money demand shocks. Other measures of monetary policy, e.g. M1, are unable to do this. Furthermore, since the narrative approach does not require a model of how the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy, it is therefore a "model-free" measure of monetary policy.
However, the narrative approach has several limitations. First, it is 2 The Federal Reserve Bulletin contains the minutes and directives of past FOMC meetings. The information includes a detailed discussion of the issues discussed at the meeting followed by the actual FOMC directive and how each FOMC member voted.
subjective. The dates are chosen by the researcher and therefore should be viewed with caution when the dates are used to predict variables that are already known to the researcher. Second, the narrative approach cannot be used to distinguish whether endogenous or exogenous factors caused the policy change. 3 However, one of the biggest shortcomings is the one-sidedness of the Romer & Romer (1989) dates. In other words, Romer & Romer (1989) only provide dates associated with tight monetary policy ignoring dates when policy is mixed. Finally, the narrative approach has been used to examine the effect of policy decisions on a quarterly or monthly basis and therefore may have little relevance for daily changes seen in exchange rate markets.
We tackle some of these problems associated with the narrative approach in general and the Romer & Romer dates in particular in the following ways. First, we provide a finer categorization of policy changes than Romer & Romer (1989) . 4 Second, we attempt to reduce the subjectivity bias inherent in the narrative approach by asking an objective third party to select the dates. The objective parties were two Wellesley College undergraduates hired to read through various issues of the Federal Reserve Bulletin and select the dates. We asked the students to look for words or phrases such as "policy bias," "possible easing," or "possible tightening," etc. which indicate shifts in policy. Third, despite the fact that providing a finer categorization of policy clearly provides greater information than Romer & Romer dates, the likelihood of subjectivity biases or policy endogeneity exists. We therefore use probit regressions to test endogeneity problems. Finally, we interact our narrative variable with the federal funds rate because our primary purpose is to identify periods of supply shifts. The interaction serves to pin down movements of federal funds rates associated with monetary policy. The idea is that the federal funds rate may provide useful information of policy changes if we can identify when the federal funds rate moved in response to supply shifts rather than demand shifts.
Our narrative measures of monetary policy are defined as follows: +1 in the T days starting with a change in the policy toward easing as measures in FOMC minutes.
-1 in the T days starting with a change in the policy toward tightening as measured in FOMC minutes. 0 otherwise. in the J days starting with a change in the policy toward easing as measured in FOMC minutes multiplied by (PCT of FOMC votes dissenting because they wanted stronger action).
-1 in the J days starting with a change in the policy toward tightening as measured in FOMC minutes multiplied by (PCT of FOMC votes dissenting because they wanted stronger action). 0 otherwise.
DUMBO =
where T is selected based on actual changes in the wording of FOMC minutes. The time period T may vary over time depending on when policy stances shift. The measure DUMB is assigned positive or negative values for T periods whereas DUMBO is constructed only using the first month because signals from dissenting voters are assumed to have a shorter impact. Figure 1 plots our narrative measure of monetary policy, the daily federal funds rate and the trade-weighted dollar since 1980. 5 The trade-weighted dollar, the daily federal funds rate and all other bi-lateral exchange rates employed in the paper were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and are given as on a end-of-day basis. The trade-weighted dollar appears to be highly correlated with the narrative measure. For example, consider the beginning of the sample. The narrative measure showed a strong bias toward tightening, the dollar spiked upward. But soon after, as the narrative measure moved toward a more neutral stance, the dollar declined to its initial value.
The close relationship continued throughout the rest of the sample. As the narrative continued to show a bias toward tightening, the dollar began to creep up until the next move to ease in 1985 causing the dollar to plummet. Throughout the rest of the sample easing of policy continued to lead to dollar depreciations whereas tightening of policy continued to lead to appreciations.
Figure 1 also shows that while the narrative measure is correlated with the federal funds rate, it is not perfectly correlated. This is specially striking when you consider important periods when the federal funds rate rose while the dollar did not. For example, during the 1981-82 period, as the Federal Reserve changed operating procedures the relationship between the federal funds rate and the narrative measure seems to weaken. Table 2 reports the mean growth in the exchange rate since 1974 under alternative regimes in annualized terms. The second column reports the mean value over the entire sample. The third and fourth columns report the mean value during tightening i.e. (DUMB = TIGHT) and by positive federal funds rate changes (∆r > 0). Finally, column five reports the means when there are positive changes in the federal funds rate and the narrative measure indicates a tight period. Table 2 also reports the standard errors in parentheses. The mean growth rates are consistently higher when the Federal Reserve has tightened as measured by DUMB or the federal funds rate. This conforms with what theory predicts. The evidence for the federal funds rate is particularly striking. The mean appear to be distinctly different during tightening. However, the standard errors are not substantially different-sometimes even larger. Most importantly, note the final column TIGHT interacted with ∆r provides consistently higher effects than the other measures by themselves and the standard errors are typically lower. We interpret this as providing support for the use of our narrative measure as an indicator of monetary policy. The 
Notes: Dollar is 26,000 * (the log change in the trade-weighted dollar exchange rate). Mark/ Dollar is 26,000 * (the log change in the deutchmark/dollar exchange rate). Pound/Dollar is 26,000 * (the log change in the pound/dollar exchange rate). Yen/Dollar is 26,000 * (the log change in the yen/dollar exchange rate). Franc/Dollar is 26,000 * (the log change in the franc/dollar exchange rate). Lira/Dollar is 26,000* (the log change in the lira/dollar exchange rate). Standard Errors are reported in parentheses.
6 For a survey of these models see Frenkel and Mussa (1985) . 7 Hereafter we refer to a random walk with drift model as a random walk model.
narrative approach provides a superior measure of monetary policy because the signal to noise ratio is much higher than alternative measures. Hence, we can measure money more precisely if we use the narrative measure of money alone or in combination with the federal funds rate.
III. The Monetary Model
When the fundamentals follow a random walk, the standard asset pricing model in the presence of risk neutral agents implies:
that the exchange rate s follows a random walk, possibly with a drift term, α. 7 ε t+1 represents the revision in the economic fundamentals (i.e. innovations) which determine exchange rates. The most interesting aspect of this model is that despite numerous attempts, no other reduced-form exchange rate model has been found to outperform it systematically.
An alternative model would be one based on purchasing power parity
and monetary approach to the balance of payments
where foreign variables are denoted with * superscripts and π is some measure (1) of inflation, m is the growth rate of money, y is the real income growth and i is the opportunity cost of holding money and is included as a determinant of the velocity. This model seems inadequate in explaining exchange rate fluctuations. For example, Frankel (1993) shows the estimated equation breaks down after the 1970s and even provides incorrectly signed coefficients.
In this paper, we argue that this model suffers from poorly specified definitions of money. If we could find a better definition of money, then perhaps we could help to solve the "exchange rate politics puzzle" [Blomberg and Hess (1997) ], but more importantly better assess the validity of one of the linchpins of international finance.
To do this we must simplify the above equations. First, we assume velocity is constant in the short run, so Equation (4) shows exchange rate fluctuations should be determined by the monetary policy of the involved countries. If the domestic country has an easier monetary policy relative to the foreign country, we would expect the exchange rate to depreciate due to the rise in the relative inflation rates and vice-versa. Hence, if we have a good measure of monetary policy, we could test the validity of this theory. The purpose of the next section is to describe such a test.
IV. Empirical Results
In this section we carry out several formal empirical exercises to determine to what extent our narrative measures of monetary policy can explain daily exchange rate dynamics.
First, we examine a simple specification with various measures of monetary policy and test the hypothesis that our narrative measure is better at explaining exchange rates. While it would be nice to compare our measure to other variables assumed to impact exchange rates (e.g. GDP), there are no other measures available at the day-to-day frequency. So as an alternative we will (4) only consider the federal funds rate and the traditional Romer-Romer dummy variable.
10 Second, we examine our model with only narrative measures and tests the hypothesis that -γ < 0. Finally, to analyze the economic significance of our measure of monetary policy, we run an out-of-sample "horse-race" between the accepted random walk hypothesis and our model.
Our results suggest three important facts. First we find that the narrative measures have greater predictive power than other measures such as the federal funds rate. Second, we fail to reject the monetary approach when using our definition of monetary policy. Third, we find that for the trade-weighted dollar, mark/dollar, pound/dollar, franc/dollar and the lira/dollar our simple specification out performs the random walk in out-of-sample forecasts as measured by a lower root mean squared error.
A. In-Sample Evidence
We begin by estimating a simple VAR (vector-autoregression) with a traditional measure of monetary policy-the federal funds rate. This is motivated by evidence that changes in the federal funds rate are a reasonably reliable indicator of monetary policy, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) . To test whether the federal funds rate is causally related to exchange rates in the Granger sense, we estimate the following simple VAR: growth is denoted by ∆s. 11 We choose the lag length in the VAR based on the Schwarz (SIC) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The SIC and AIC suggest slightly different lag lengths. Five lags was better than shorter lags for the AIC and better than longer lags for the SIC. We opted for five lags in our specification because it is economically meaningful as it provides a week's worth information. The qualitative results are not sensitive to changes in the lag length.
Exchange rates are measured in terms of dollar-per-foreign currency unit, and exchange rate changes are reported in log first-differences both to ensure stationarity and to conform to the empirical exchange rate literature. All equations include a constant and changes in federal fund rates. Once estimated, we plot the impulse responses over a month based on our estimates 1974:1:1 to 1995:3:31.
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Not surprisingly, in the impulse response functions we find weak evidence that federal funds rate shocks affect some exchange rates causing them to spike upward after approximately one week However, we find no statistically significant impact for each of the exchange rates. Even for the currencies most affected by the federal funds rate, the franc/dollar and mark/dollar, the effects are quite short-lived (2 weeks), volatile, and given the large error band do not seem to be particularly significant. For example, a one standard deviation shock of the federal funds rate causes the franc/dollar growth to fluctuate around both positive and negative values. It is not surprising then that including the federal funds rate has not improved the predictive power of monetary models of exchange rates. 13 11 We also considered an error correction (ECVAR) specification. However, the results including an EC term do not change any of the results. 12 The errors were computed using the method described in Doan (1992) , using 100 draws from the asymptotic distributions of the VAR and the covariance matrix of innovations. The results were not sensitive to higher order draws. 13 These results look remarkably similar to those obtained by Tarhan (1995) . In his paper, he provided some evidence that open market operations Granger cause interest rates and to some extent exchange rates.
These results are consistent with those reported by Hamilton (1996) who shows that the federal funds rate is an extremely imprecise measure of money due to the large number of outliers. Given this finding, coupled with our own, it seems promising to consider an alternative measure of monetary policy.
Next we include the narrative measure of monetary policy in a simple ARX specification. All equations include a constant, five lags of changes in federal funds rates, five lags of the dependent variable, the original Romer & Romer dummies, and our variables for monetary policy. We estimate this specification over the entire sample period, January 1974 to March 1995. Table 3 reports the results of the hypothesis test that the narrative measure of monetary policy (independent from traditional measures) influences exchange rates. The first column denotes the dependent variables and the other columns denote the money variables described above. Table 3 shows that the narrative measures of monetary policy independent of the federal funds rate significantly affect exchange rates in the simple ARX. Table 3 reports the estimated impact of DUMB, DUMBER and DUMBO on exchange rates and p-value from the χ 2 test that the coefficients are equal to zero.
14 The magnitude of the coefficient associated with DUMB is negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level for the dollar, mark/dollar, yen/ dollar, franc/dollar and lira/dollar. The magnitude of the coefficient associated with DUMBER is also negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level for all of the exchange rates except the lira/dollar. The magnitude of the coefficient associated with DUMBO is positive and statistically significant at the 0.10 level for all of the exchange rates except the pound/dollar and lira/ dollar.
15 Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficients are quite similar across the different countries implying the impact of monetary policy is systematic suggests that the narrative measures of monetary policy provide a superior measure of the effect of monetary policy on exchange rates than the federal funds rate and the one-sided Romer measure. To see if the results hold up in the more specific case (Model I) we conduct similar exercises as in Table 3 but exclude the federal funds rate. The results from this exercise are reported in Table 4 . We also carried out similar exercises using a minimum absolute deviations (MAD) estimator. The MAD estimator minimizes absolute deviations rather than squared deviations. In Model II, we employ this estimator to ensure that our results are not contaminated by 
where Z* are the appropriately weighted instruments, Z t . We correct our estimates by applying Newey-West (1987) with a lag of 1. 19 The GMM estimator yields estimates ( ) of our vector of parameters β which obey the following:
and D is the expectation of the gradient of the orthogonality conditions with respect to β , and S is the spectral density of the orthogonality conditions evaluated at zero. Hence, if H(β) represents the true 18 Estimating Model II is actually an application of instrumental variables rather than GMM.
However, estimating ( )
is equivalent to GMM which is what we do. 19 The general results are insensitive to the lag structure. βˆ value of the statistics, then the asymptotic distribution of the estimated function derived from a Taylor's series approximation is
The results are reported in Table 5 . In each case DUMB, DUMBER and DUMBO continue to hold. The narrative measures of monetary policy seem to be robust to alternative distributional assumptions. In each case, DUMB, DUMBER and DUMBO continue to be important determinants of exchange rates. Furthermore, in each case, we fail to reject the null of over-identifying restrictions at all conventional levels. Lira/Dollar endogenity between exchange rates and monetary policy. For example, it is certainly possible that monetary policy responds to exchange rates rather than the other way around, and if anticipated, such a causation could explain the relationship found in tables 3-5. We consider the possibility our measures of monetary policy are endogenously determined by exchange rates by examining a variety of models. First, we consider probability models where exchange rates influence the probability of a policy change. Second, we consider a simple VAR where our monetary policy variable is once again determined by exchange rates. In both cases, there is no support for exchange rates influencing our measures of monetary policy.
We begin by estimating two probit models-one where the latent variable is unity when the Federal Reserve eases and zero otherwise and the other where the latent variable is one when the Fed tightens and zero otherwise. In each case, we test the probability that policy changes due to a constant and one to five lags of the log change of the exchange rate and one to five lags of the actual value of the latent variable. These probit models amount to onesided tests of Granger-causality. We also estimated a simple VAR with one to five lags of DUMB and one to five lags of the exchange rates. This test amounts to a discrete but two-sided test of Granger-causality.
As stated above, if there is a problem with endogeneity, we would expect as exchange rates depreciate, the Federal Reserve tightens to prevent the currency from being under-valued and vice-versa. In this case, changes in the exchange rates cause the Federal Reserve to change policy which could bring in to question our earlier results. However, the results from these tests, not reported here for space considerations, provide no evidence of endogeneity problems. In every case, exchange rates fail to affect the probability of tightening or easing or DUMB at below the 0.10 significance level. Hence, there seems ample in-sample evidence to support our use of the narrative model.
B. Out-of-Sample Forecasts
In this subsection we analyze the out-of-sample performance of our measures of monetary policy. We estimate both the random walk and our narrative model from January 1974 to December 1979 and employ these coefficient values to forecast out-of-sample from January 1980 to March 1980. For robustness, we do a similar exercise for another out-of-sample forecast from October 1987 to the end of the year. We choose these time periods for the following reasons. First, these are two comparable time periods of our data to the Romer & Romer dates. Given that we would like to estimate our model in a time period agreed by others as a time policy change, we began estimating the models in early 1980 and late 1987. Second, we wanted to select dates at logical break points in our sample. Therefore, we roughly break up our sample in thirds. We then forecast after the first third and after the second third. Table 6 reports the root-mean squared error (RMSE) of these out-of-sample forecasts. The first column reports the exchange rate examined while the other columns report which model is used and the forecast horizon. The results are quite promising for out-of-sample prediction. For each exchange rate except for the yen/dollar, the one-step ahead forecast of the monetary model beats the random walk. The differences are even relatively large-up to 11 percent improvement over the random walk. However, even more telling is that the RMSE continues to be smaller versus the random walk over each horizon. The differences in RMSE's continue to be relatively substantial, on the order of a 1-13 percent improvement over the random walk model at the five to ten day horizon.
Formal testing of the hypothesis that the errors are statistically different from the random walk model also reveals strong evidence in support of our approach. In this case, only the yen/dollar fails to show strong evidence of statistical differences at each horizon.
We use the Diebold & Mariano (1995) test of the hypothesis that the difference between the mean-squared prediction errors from the two models is zero. The Diebold & Mariano statistic is is the autocovariance of the loss differential at displacement τ with population mean loss differential µ and sample mean loss differential .
d Under the null hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy, the MSE differential is zero and DM is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal. In this case, we allow for a fixed lag of 10 when employing the Newey-West (1987) correction since our longest horizon is 10 periods ahead. Once again, the results are insensitive to the lag structure imposed in the model.
V. Conclusion
The structural monetary model of exchange rates performs poorly both in terms of point estimation and in terms of forecasting ability. We argue that this a primarily due to imprecise measurements of monetary policy. We use a narrative approach to measure monetary policy and demonstrate that these narrative measures perform better than traditional measures. However, more importantly, the narrative measures have substantial predictive power in explaining short-run exchange rate fluctuation as our model outperforms the random walk in out-of-sample forecasting at one to ten day horizon for the trade-weighted dollar, mark/dollar, pound/dollar, franc/dollar and lira/dollar.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to use the narrative approach to explain short-run exchange rate dynamics. As many currency traders have made a great deal of money using information supplied by economists who track the Fed or "Fed-watchers" this avenue of research seems promising.
